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Review Essay
Attorneys' Problems in Making Ethical Decisions
EDWIN H. GREENEBAUM*
In representing clients, attorneys exercise their authority and responsi-
bility as members of the legal profession. As long as there has been
an adversary system, there has been dispute regarding advocates' conflicting
loyalties to their clients and to the public, a debate which has been
pursued with renewed vigor in recent years. While partisans in this
dialogue push their normative viewpoints, a significant proposition tends
to be ignored: Attorneys' action decisions are the result of interaction
processes between attorneys, clients and the groups to which they belong.
Because the dynamics of these processes are little examined, the meaning of
attorneys' behavior is poorly understood. Accordingly, those making the
transition from layman to lawyer, students and young attorneys, find the
legal ethics literature unsatisfying.'
The adversary ethics literature explores the conflicting action implica-
tions of centrally important professional values which are not usually
considered controversial. They include the obligations of legal profes-
sionals: to provide services to those who need them (especially criminal
defendants); to become fully informed regarding legal matters in order to
provide fully competent services; and to hold confidential clients' privi-
ledged communications. Other obligations, also uncontroversial, which
are frequently seen as having conflicting implications are that lawyers
should be candid and truthful, should support the search for truth, should
not themselves be the cause or source for contentiousness, and should not
be personally implicated in the perpetration of injustices. While the
comments which follow focus on a document which advocates client-
oriented ethics, the criticisms apply equally to the arguments of public
interest partisans.
*A.B. 1958. Harvard College; LL.B. 1961, Harvard University; LL.M. 1967, University
of Michigan. Professor of Law, Indiana University, Bloomington.
'My understanding of these concerns arises from my work with law students and
alumni in Civil Procedure, which revolves around the adversary system, and Roles and
Relations in Legal Practice, a course which has as its purposes introducing law students
to interpersonal phenomena as related to their future law practices and leading them to reflect
on lawyers' roles and their personal relations to these roles. For a description of the course's
content and methods, see Greenebaum & Parsloe, Roles and Relations in Legal Practice, 28 J.
LEGAL EDUc. 228 (1976).
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Examples of attorneys' action dilemmas are explored in Monroe
Freedman's Lawyers' Ethics in an Adversary System:'
As part of that training [provided by the Criminal Trial Institute of which
Freedman was Co-Director in 1966], I gave an opening lecture on legal
ethics, in which I discussed what my colleagues and I had found to be the
three hardest questions faced by the criminal defense lawyer. Those
questions were: (1) Should you put a witness on the stand when you know
the witness is going to commit perjury? (2) Should you cross-examine a
prosecution witness whom you know to be accurate and truthful, in order
to make the witness appear to be mistaken or lying? (3) Should you give
your client advice about the law when you. know the advice may induce the
client to commit perjury? I concluded, with admitted uncertainty, that the
adversary system, with its corollary, the confidential relationship between
lawyer and client, often requires an affirmative answer to those questions. 3
Many in the community find it troubling that lawyers defend clients
they know to be guilty, test the credibility of evidence they know to be
accurate and, especially, aggravate the injuries of those already victimized
by using every available technicality on behalf of their clients. Any who
doubt these to be acknowledged costs of attorneys' conduct should read
"Cross-Examination: Destroying the Truthful Witness" (Chapter 4 in
Freedman's book). "Destroy" is not too strong a word. The value of
literature such as Lawyers' Ethics in an Adversary System is in making
clear to laymen, including law students, the rationalizations for conduct of
attorneys which seem to many incongruent with honesty and fair dealing.
It is particularly helpful to face these issues in contexts with specific facts,
where decisions may be seen to have pragmatic costs:
The system of professional responsibility that I have been advancing, on
the other hand, is one that attempts to deal with ethical problems in
context-that is, as part of a functional sociopolitical system concerned
with the administration of justice in a free society-and giving due regard
both to motive and to consequences.4
The legal ethics literature tends to vote in favor of client-oriented
resolutions of these issues or for the contrary positions argued to be
required by the Code of Professional Responsiblity, the American Bar
Association Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice and other author-
2
M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975) [hereinafter cited as
FREEDMAN]. Freedman is the dean of Hofstra University School of Law. This book, which is
treated as an example in this paper, is in part a political event. Dean Freedman explains the
book would probably not have been written had not Warren Burger, then a judge of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, called for Dean Freedman's
disbarment and dismissal from his then position as professor of law at George Washington






ities.5  (That the Code of Professional Responsibility et al. contain
contradictory provisions is, of course, part of the argument. 6) Casting one's
vote is no doubt legitimate, especially if one has cogent commentary to
contribute to the dialogue; but new contributions which would cause
anyone to choose one side or the other are scarce. While the literature
explores the contrary action implications of values validated by the
profession's traditions and authoritative standards and states positions
regarding the resulting conflicts, attorneys' decisionmaking problems in
ethical matters are generally neglected. In addition, the value implications
in these action dilemmas are more subtle than is usually acknowledged.
DECISIONMAKING PROBLEMS
As young lawyers begin to perceive the potential conflicts of interest
between their clients, themselves, their law firms, the legal profession and
society, conflicts which may center on emotionally charged matters, they
discover that practicing law has distressing aspects. The ethics literature
does not much help attorney initiates in their suffering the practice of law
to the extent three aspects of decisionmaking problems are neglected: (1)
the emotional aspects of ethical decisions, (2) the limitations on attorneys'
freedom of choice and (3) the position of the individual attorney as a
member of a group, the legal profession.
Emotional Aspects
There are a substantial variety of motivations prompting individuals to
join the legal profession. But to most first-year law students, law is
authority and has the mission of maintaining order. The profession draws
to it persons who want this authority to do and be certain things; it must be
clear, predictable and just and show the clear road to proper ethical
choices. The disappointing fact is that the law is in many respects unclear
and unpredictable and is sometimes the engine of injustice. Further, law is
a helping profession in which practitioners are faced with subtle and
5The many review and letter-to-the-editor writers who have commented on Freedman's
book support this observation. Whether or not this is the final comment on this book, it is
certainly not the first. See Dorsen, Book Review, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 764 (1976);
Kennedy, Book Review, 4 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 171 (1976); Kunstler, Book Review, 4 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 895 (1976); Lazarus, Book Review, 51 N.Y.U.L. REV. 348 (1976); Margolis, Book
Review, 50 CONN. B:J. 103 (1976); McDonald, Book Review, 62 A.B.A.J. 848 (1976); Meagher,
Book Review, 4 FORDHAM UR . L.J. 289 (1976); Neal, Book Review, 29 VAND. L. REV. 529
(1976); Phillips, Book Review, 43 TENN. L. REV. 179 (1976); Rotunda, Book Review, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 622 (1976); Weckstein, Book Review, Civ. LIB. REV. June/July 1976, at 72; Weiss, Book
Review, 44 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 202 (1975).
6It does not go too far to say that Dean Freedman finds the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility and other authorities hypocritical. See, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 57, 63-
64. For a demonstration of inconsistencies in statements by his arch nemesis, Warren Burger,
see id. at 44-45.
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difficult conflicts of interest between themselves, their clients and society,
frequently involving distressing human circumstances. The ethical choices
facing the legal practitioner are a challenge to anyone's maturity. The
reality of the law, then, is unsatisfactory, and students and practitioners
will be motivated to avoid seeing it.
The traditions of the profession do provide rationalizations for those
who would abandon their own judgment to that of the group, although
practitioners may have to choose between discrepancies in role behaviors
acceptable to subgroups of the profession: the ABA or the local bar, firms
representing substantial business interests, the personal injury bar or legal
services groups and so forth. Whatever rationalizations lawyers accept,
however, there will remain that portion of their personalities which holds
to notions of goodness which were learned as children growing up in a
family and in the general community.7 Coping with the resulting internal
conflicts is a part of every attorney's personal agenda.
The alternative to abandoning one's judgment to that of the group is to
learn to acknowledge one's conflicting personal motivations and to make
judgments on explicit recognition and weighing of facts and values
influencing decisions. If this is the path of greater responsibility, however,
it is also potentially one of greater distress, requiring as it does living with
insoluable dilemmas, with concern for the suffering of clients and others,
and with never having certain knowledge that one's decisions are right or
wrong. Attorneys can never be certain of the moral correctness of their
decisions because of the uncertainty of values and because of uncertain
knowledge of the likely consequences. Training in ethical behavior cannot
responsibly content itself with extinguishing inappropriate defenses to
practitioners' anxieties, but must help in learning new behaviors, which
while consonant with professional values, will also make possible living
with the stresses of professional work.8
I believe that ethics commentators share with law students the wistful
hope that reasoned discussion can result in the resolution of dilemmas and
that a code of professional responsibility can and ought to provide clear
and generally acceptable guidance to attorney conduct.9 The ethical
problems facing attorneys, however, are true dilemmas, and action deci-
7The occasional comment by a few criminal defense attorneys that they cannot defend
guilty child molestors or rapists is only the audible remnant of what I hear from law students
in Roles and Relations in Legal Practice, see note I supra, who frequently express reservations
regarding the defense of a guilty client, even where only a property offense is involved.
Compare the reported reactions of senior partners in a prestigious Washington law firm who
would allow firm members to be surveyed on professional ethics in criminal defense only orally
and anonymously because they feared the reactions of local judges to publication of their
"true views." FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 39.
8See Menzies, A Case-Study in the Functioning of Social Systems as a Defense Against
Anxiety, in GROUP RELATIONs READER (A. Coleman 8c W. Bexton eds. 1975); note 12 infra.
9Dean Freedman certainly is critical of ambiguities and failures to make distinctions in
the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility. See FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 60-61.
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sions will not be generally acceptable. The extent to which decisions
should be governed by authorities and the extent to which they should be
left to the consciences of individual attorneys is itself a value question. An
attorney with appropriate humility will frequently defer in his judgment to
colleagues or to the mores of the legal community. The extent to which
the profession pre-empts the individual attorney's judgment by rules with
enforcible sanctions is a decision made through political processes. The
legal profession will not become more "ethical" until allocation of
authority and acceptance of responsibility are more realistically faced.
Just as it is difficult for parents with children and for doctors with
patients, it will always be difficult for lawyers to deny their dependent
clients something they want or something an attorney feels a client needs.
And it will always remain difficult for attorneys to know when they are
being appropriately humble in giving deference to group norms and when
they are merely avoiding responsibility or being personally prudential.
Limitations on Freedom of Choice
Practitioners, coming from a posture of not wanting responsibility,
are plunged into contexts where their freedom of choice is very limited.
Discussion in much of the literature seems to proceed from the premise that
attorneys are free to make their own ethical decisions. Especially for
attorneys just starting out, this is just not the case. The most extreme
situtation occurs when attorneys are instructed by their employers-senior
partners in their firms, not their clients-to do something which the
attorney considers improper. Recent graduates report being told to
commence actions, make defences or file motions which the junior attorney
believes to be groundless, where the senior's instruction is predicated not
on second guessing that judgment, but merely on the fact the client wants
the action taken or will be benefited by it.1O
Even without such direct coercion, attorneys motivated to maintain,
not to mention advance, their economic positions and social status are
under intense pressures to conform to the approved conduct of the groups
or individuals which maintain them, which include clients, employers and
the local bar. Wherein do the canons of professional conduct weigh in the
economic security of one's spouse and children and one's aspirations for
position in the community? Being a lawyer will have different meaning for
different people, but it will have important meaning both to individual
attorneys and their families as well as to others important to them.
Sacrificing status for the sake of ethical conduct is not easily done.
The emotional pressures to view oneself as honest and honorable cause
practitioners to rationalize what they are compelled to do as ethical
IOSee note 1 supra for my contacts with young lawyers' concerns.
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conduct, or they are likely to find a new context in which to earn a
livelihood. It is no wonder that, however rationalized, the action ethic of
the profession is most client-oriented in those areas of practice wherein
clients are best situated to hire and fire their attorneys, and that client-
oriented ethics are on shakier ground where attorneys' economic security
depends on relations to institutions other than the client." Effective
discussion of ethical conduct of the profession must go beyond the
advancement of rationalizations to enhancing attorneys' effective choice.
Attorneys as Members of a Group
The above discussion views attorneys' membership in professional
groups as both seductive and coercive, but even more is involved. Working
in groups is notoriously difficult. Problems of' authority, dependency,
intimacy and security, among others, are acute for group members. Group
myths and unstated assumptions may govern conduct, making more
difficult the accomplishment of work. 12
Lines of authority and legitimate leadership are strikingly unclear in
the legal profession. What are the- allocations of authority between the
American Bar Association and state and local bars, between the legislature
and the courts, between statewide appellate courts and local judges,
between individual attorneys and employing firms? At least in regard to
questions of ethical standards in regard to difficult matters, no one really
knows. This diffuseness of authority is possibly a good thing in a
pluralistic society in which the weight to be given opposing values is very
controversial, but the lack of clarity is debilitating to those wishing to
guide their actions in accordance with legitimately authorized standards.
And finally, the ultimate Catch-22 for those seeking ethical comfort, in
a professional group which is largely self-governing, if governed at all,
individual attorneys are responsible not only for their own actions, but for
the actions of other attorneys as well. This is not merely a theoretical or
imposed value, but something felt by attorneys. Attorneys are very aware
that a choice to refrain from doing an ethically distasteful act on behalf of a
client, a choice validated by the Code of Professional Responsibility,3 is
"See, e.g., Blumberg, The Practice of Law as Confidence Game, 2 LAW & Soc'v Rev. 15
(1967); Platt, Schechter & Tiffany, In Defense of Youth: A Case of the Public Defender in
Juvenile Court, 43 IND. L.J. 619 (1968).
'
2Those interested in pursuing this subject are advised to look into the work of the A.K.
Rice Institute, including its group relations conferences which have as their focus the exercise
of authority in groups. A useful collection of essays by Bion, Rice, Rioch, Menninger and
others is contained in A.K. RICE INSTITUTE, GROUP RELATIONS READER (A. Coleman & W.
Bexton eds. 1975). Inquiries regarding conferences or the Group Relations Reader may be
addressed to A.K. Rice Institute, 1610 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009
13ABA CoDe OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY E.G. 2-26.
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facilitated by the knowledge that the client is likely to find another more
congenial attorney and that the dirty work will be done.' 4
IMPLICATIONS OF CLIENT-ORIENTED VALUES
The premises of client-oriented ethics seem to be the obligations of
confidentiality, of vigorous advocacy and of provision of legal services.'5
These obligations exist because they are promised, because they are
functional in the search for truth and justice according to law, and because
they serve humanitarian goals. A relationship of trust between attorney
and client in which clients feel they can be safely candid with their attorney
is necessary to these goals.
The contractual promises of confidentiality and vigorous advocacy are
not unqualified, however, nor is the obligation of the profession to provide
services. (The implications of humanitarian service will be discussed later.)
If an attorney is not obligated to kill an adverse witness for the benefit of a
client, the question becomes where lines are to be drawn. The guiding
principles would seem to be that attorneys are not themselves to be
implicated in wrong doing, nor in their advocacy and advancing a client's
interest are they to confuse or obstruct the search for truth and justice.
The literature, however, while recognizing that limitations exist,16
tends to treat ethical obligations as absolite. For example, in Freedman's
discussion of whether an attorney should participate in a client's presenta-
tion of perjured testimony, 7 he argues that warning a client that the
1"A lawyer should be able to refuse a client for any reason, including mere suspicion of
dishonesty (except in the extreme and unlikely circumstances that the client would thereby be
left with no attorney available at all)." FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 54.
Irrational or not, however, in those jurisdictions in which the defense of unchastity
is still the law, the attorney is bound to provide it on the guilty client's behalf. For
the lawyer who finds the presentation of that defense, and perhaps others in rape
cases, to go beyond what he or she can in good conscience do, there are two courses
that should be followed. The first is to be active in efforts to reform the law in that
regard; the second is to decline to accept the defense of rape cases, on the grounds of
a conflict of interest (a strong personal view) that would interfere with providing
the defendant with his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.
Id. at 48-49 (footnotes omitted). Note that "unchastity" is not in fact a "defense," but merely
evidence with some relevance to a consent defense.
"5See generally id. at 1-8.
'
6E.g., id. at 71-72. Dean Freedman is not willing to justify the violation of ethical rules,
such as one prohibiting actively falsifying evidence, by attorneys motivated
to see justice done, despite some inconvenient fact .... Those lawyers who choose
that role, even in the occasional case under the compulsion of a strong sense of the
justness of their client's cause, must do so on their own moral responsibility and at
their own risk, and without the sanction of generalized standards of professional
responsibility.
Id. at 76. Without regard to motive and consequences? See text accompanying note 4 supra.
The distinction which Dean Freedman finds between assisting a client to manufacture
evidence and to present perjured testimony may not be seen by everyone.
17FREEDMAsN, supra note 1, ch. 3, "Perjury: The Criminal Defense Lawyer's Trilemma."
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attorney cannot condone perjury will caution the client against candor
with the attorney. Thus, the attorney will be less well informed. Clients
may even withhold information which they do not have the legal
sophistication to recognize as exculpating. As Dean Freedman observed:
"[T]he lawyer will not be successful without convincing the client that full
disclosure will never result in prejudice to the client by any word or action
of the attorney."' 8
The fault of the argument is that it does not recognize that a client's
choice to be represented by counsel is a choice to be represented by counsel
who has limitations. A client accused of a crime does not have the right to
go free on the basis of perjured testimony. It is basically the client's
decision: there are benefits to being candid with counsel; the price is
legitimate. Of course, clients must be informed if they are to make choices.
The attorney's obligation and skill includes explaining the benefits and
limitations of his professional services to prospective clients.' 9
The objection that informing prospective clients that the attorney will
not assist clients in presenting perjured testimony will cause clients not to
be completely candid with counsel does not account for the complexity of
establishing trust.20 Absolute candor between attorney and client is not
possible; they are insufficiently intimate for that, being strangers to each
other. The realistic goal must be the greatest possible trust and candor.
Every attorney has conflicting interests with every client.2' Clients know
this, and attorneys pretending to unqualified loyalty are not promoting
trust. Early candor regarding attorney limitations can help produce early
and explicit agreement regarding the terms of service. This in turn should
help produce greater security in an attorney-client relationship, which will
help facilitate greater candor, and should help avoid embarassing mis-
understandings at later stages when attorney is representing client in
negotiations or in litigation. (That attorneys would prefer to dictate, rather
than reach agreement, regarding the terms of their service may be part of
the problem.2 2) This is not to say that unforeseen developments will not
occur and difficult decisions may have to be made, perhaps instantaneously.
The remaining value supporting client-oriented ethics, not yet dis-
cussed, is that the provision of legal services serves humanitarian goals.
Isld. at 30.
19It is likely that attorneys are not as explicit as they should be in discussing both
benefits and limitations with prospective clients. The how and why of this is too large a topic
for this essay. My experience with law students suggests that insecurity regarding the value of
lawyers' services in one cause.
20"[T]he inevitable result ... would be to caution the client not to be completely candid
with the attorney. That, of course, returns us to resolving the trilemma by maintaining
confidentiality and candor [by the attorney?], but sacrificing complete knowledge ... Id. at
38. 2TFor a start, attorneys have an economic incentive to provide clients the least service for
the greatest possible fee.22See generally D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? (1974).
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Evaluation of humanitarian service requires consideration of aspects of the
attorney-client relationship not frequently examined. It would seem to
require the consideration of attorney and client as whole persons.
A basic issue for philosophy and ethics is whether individuals are
responsible for their actions. The premise of the law is that for any given
act the answer is yes or no; there is no middle ground.23 The premise from
reality is, of course, very different. Responsibility is relative; the actor
causing injury is a victim as well as a perpetrator. The provision of the
services of an attorney may in part recognize and compensate for this
reality.
Whatever their responsibility, ethical or legal, individuals confronted
with legal problems are in an unhappy position. They have difficulty
speaking for themselves not only for lack of sophistication and expertise in
legal matters, but also because their personal involvement, and possibly
distressing circumstances, make them less effective than they might
otherwise be. If the attorney who represents himself has a fool for a client,
how helpless must the layman be. In light of these considerations,
providing a champion to individuals upon whom legal institutions are
bearing down is clearly humanitarian.
From a humanitarian viewpoint, however, a relationship with an
attorney has implications for clients beyond winning or losing the case.
People with legal problems frequently have troubles, in part, because they
have difficulty in their relationships with others. Lawyering has thera-
peutic implications even though the lawyer is not a therapist. To adopt a
phrase, the attorney is either a part of the solution or part of the problem.
There is no way to stand apart. There are many variations on this theme.
An important one is that troubled individuals frequently view their world
as one where people exist principally to use each other and do not have
constructive, mutual relationships. The attorney who acquiesces in being
only a tool of such a client may be reinforcing those perceptions and
behaviors which tend to involve the client in difficult situations. Thus, the
provision of what Freedman and others see as dedicated legal service,
without anyone being responsible for its effects, may result in an attorney
colluding with a client in dehumanizing them both, to the detriment of the
human dignity which client-oriented ethics profess to support.
In summary, interaction processes are complex, and human behavior,
including that of attorneys, is not easily understood. In these respects
much of the legal ethics literature tends to obscure rather than illuminate
professional responsibility problems.
2SThere are, of course, possible exceptions to this generalization, e.g., the law encourages
settlements and will not even examine jury verdicts too closely for indications of compromise.
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